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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the California Public Employees Pension
System ("CalPERS") has received extensive attention for its active
participation in
corporate governance. CalPERS's
activities
established it as a leader among activist institutions.1 CalPERS's
Murray and Kathleen Bring Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
T.J. Maloney Professor of Business Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Jeff Gordon,
Keith Johnson, Un Kyung Park, Wayne Schneider, Damon Silvers, Randall Thomas, and John
Wilcox for their valuable help in project design and for their useful comments.
1. See CalPERS, CalPERS Shareowner Forum, http://www.calpersgovernance.org/forum
home.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2007) ('The California Public Employees' Retirement System
(known as 'CalPERS') has long been a leader in the corporate governance movement.").
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strategy was based on identifying underperforming companies with
poor governance practices and then working to change those
governance practices and improve performance. 2 Through its
implementation of this strategy, CalPERS was at the forefront of
broader-based initiatives to increase shareholder monitoring,
initiatives that included the use of shareholder proposals to improve
corporate governance and support of the SEC's shareholder direct
access proposal. 3 CalPERS also embraced Congress's invitation to
public pension funds to take an active role in monitoring securities
fraud class actions through its visible and influential role in the high4
profile Cendant litigation.
CalPERS has served as a case study for many as a model of
institutional activism. Academics, regulators, and policymakers have
looked to the examples of CalPERS and several other public pension
funds to support the claims that institutional investors can use their
substantial equity stakes and sophistication effectively to overcome
collective action problems, and that institutional activism can improve
corporate performance.5 Public pension funds hold approximately 20%
of publicly traded U.S. equity and, according to the U.S. Census
2.
See, e.g., Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Focus List Targets 11 Companies for
Lagging Stock, Financial, Governance Performance (Mar. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2007/marchfocus-list-targets 11.xml
(describing CalPERS's focus list strategy). At least one study found this strategy to be
remarkably successful. See Steven Nesbitt, Long-term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A
Study of the "CalPERS"Effect, 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 78 (1994) (finding a cumulative increase
averaging 41.3% for each company over a five-year period subsequent to CalPERS's intervention,
following a period of relative under-performance); see also LILLI A. GORDON & JOHN POUND,
ACTIVE INVESTING IN THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET: PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS: A
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM 21, 44 (1993)
(finding that activist investment strategies used by CalPERS produced superior returns). But see
Sanford M. Jacoby, Convergence by Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan, 55 AM. J. COMP. L.
239, 248-49 (2007) (describing conflicting empirical research on the effectiveness of CalPERS's
activism).
3.
See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 2, at 245-46 (describing CalPERS's frequent use of
shareholder proposals relating to corporate governance in the late 1980s).
4.
See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1998) (appointing the
CalPERS Group as lead plaintiff).
5.
See, e.g., David L. Gregory, The Problematic Status of Employee Compensation and
Retiree Pension Security: Resisting the State, Reforming the Corporation,5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37,
54 (1995) ('The Calpers model powerfully demonstrates that stockholder activism by public
sector pension funds can have very positive influences upon corporate profitability through
effective corporate leadership."); Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional
Investors: Evidence from CalPERS,51 J. FIN. 227, 251 (1996) (reporting that CalPERS received a
return of almost $19 million on its $3.5 million investment in activism during the period from
1987 to 1993); see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690
(explaining the adoption of the lead plaintiff provision in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, stating that "[t]he Committee believes that increasing the role of
institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class and assist the courts").
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Bureau, held over $2.5 trillion in cash and securities as of the end of
2004-05.6 Collectively, public pension funds have the potential to be a
powerful shareholder force, and the example of CalPERS and its
activities have spurred many to advocate greater institutional
activism.
CalPERS is only one fund, however. There are a substantial
number of public pension funds-at least 2,656 as of 2005. 7 Many of
these funds are relatively new; they were formed as a result of
revisions to state and municipal benefit programs. 8 Accordingly, in
order to understand the potential role of public pension funds in
corporate governance, we go beyond CalPERS in this Article. Little is
known about the vast majority of public pension funds and their
involvement in corporate governance. What, if any, governance
activities are other public pension funds involved in, and why?
This Article offers some preliminary data. Using a combination
of publicly available information, interviews, and survey data, the
Article provides a status report on the developing role of public
pension funds in corporate governance. In part, a description of
institutional activism is a moving target. Many funds report that they
have increased or changed the nature of their activity in response to
legislation, experience, or market developments. At the same time, our
data reveal important factors concerning the overall level and type of
public pension fund activism. Our primary focus is on discerning what
factors correlate with (and potentially cause) public pension funds to
engage in a particular form of activism.
What have we learned? First, activity levels vary dramatically.
Although some funds engage in a substantial amount of governance
activity, a significant number do little or nothing. The most significant
factor distinguishing among funds is size: funds with more assets
under management are far more active in corporate governance.
Second, public pension funds engage in a very limited spectrum of
activities. Virtually no funds in our sample played any role in the
nomination of director candidates, formally or informally. Similarly,
although CalPERS has made high profile use of the shareholder

6.
U.S. Census Bureau, National Summary of State and Local Government Employee22,
2007),
(Sept.
Year
2004-2005
Finances:
Fiscal
System
Retirement
http://ftp2.census.gov/govslretirel2005retOl-txt.txt.
7.
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 State and Local Government Retirement System Survey
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/www/retire05view.html (reporting that 2005
survey "covered 2,656 public employee retirement systems").
8.
See Marguerite Schneider, The Status of U.S. Public Pension Plans, 25 REV. PUB.
PERSONNEL ADMIN. 107, 108 (2005) (reporting that, in 1998, there were only 700 public employee
retirement systems).
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proposal process, very few other funds have followed its example. For
the most part, public pension fund activism is limited to low-visibility
activities, such as participation in corporate governance organizations
or withholding votes from a management nominee. One of the best
examples is the widespread willingness to withhold votes from
director candidates. Proxy advisory services frequently will
recommend a director "withhold" vote, and many institutions follow
such recommendations. Unlike other forms of activism, such as
nominating a competing slate of directors, a director withhold vote
does not single out a fund as an activist. This makes withholding votes
a relatively low cost and low risk form of activism.
Finally, our data reveal a marked contrast between litigationspecifically service as lead plaintiff in securities fraud litigation-and
non-litigation activism. Smaller funds and funds that delegate more
functions and rely on the resources and incentives of outside agentsincluding active portfolio managers and proxy advisory services, such
as Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS")-engage in less nonlitigation activism. Public pension funds participate much more
extensively in shareholder litigation than in other governance
activities. Despite the importance of asset size and delegation for nonlitigation participation levels, we also find that for litigation-related
activism, smaller funds and funds that delegate participate with equal
frequency.
What is the significance of these findings? Our findings offer
reasons to be skeptical of the so-called promise of institutional
activism. If the vast majority of public pension funds do not
participate extensively in corporate governance, reforms such as the
1992 amendments to the federal proxy rules, which eased restrictions
on the ability of funds to communicate on matters relating to a proxy
vote, may be of limited value. Limited shareholder participation also
may hamper the potential effectiveness of proposals that would allow
direct shareholder nomination of directors. Most importantly, we
report extensive delegation of governance decisions to external agents,
including portfolio managers and proxy advisors. This delegation
raises a substantial concern that the effectiveness of institutional
activism will be limited by fund agency problems, including the
economic incentives of those exercising delegated governance powers.
Our predictions in this context are limited to public pension
funds. To the extent that reform proposals to facilitate shareholder
activism are implemented, those reforms may, of course, be used by
other types of institutions. Current evidence shows, for example, that
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hedge funds are far more active than public pension funds in seeking
board representation.9 Similarly, union funds, unlike public pension
funds, make regular use of the shareholder proposal rule. 10
Investment companies (mutual funds) generally are reluctant to
engage in more visible forms of activism and have not taken an active
role in shareholder litigation.1 1
Despite the pessimistic outlook for public pension fund
activism in general, the reluctance on the part of funds to engage in
visible activism has led to limited coalition-building efforts between
more activist and less activist funds. Public pension funds may lend
support to other more activist shareholders. The simplest form of
"coalition" involves anonymously voting with a more activist fund.
While few institutions are willing to take up the high profile activism
of CalPERS, many more institutions are willing to support CalPERS
with their votes. Our interviews reveal that activist union funds (often
larger, national union funds) are particularly eager to solicit the
support of more activist public pension funds, which can add both
legitimacy and votes to union-sponsored initiatives.
The difference between public pension fund participation in
litigation and non-litigation forms of governance sheds light on what
motivates funds toward activism. The extensive participation in
litigation by both larger and smaller funds is in marked contrast to
some of the funds' own explanations for their activity level (or lack
thereof). Many funds in our sample responded that they were
reluctant to engage in activism because of their small size and limited
staff and resources. They also cited their desire to avoid
confrontational behavior. Yet despite the fact that litigation is openly
confrontational, is a distraction of staff time and resources, and fails
to provide lead plaintiffs with greater returns than those available
9.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024-42, 1062-72 (2007) (describing hedge fund
activism).
10. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
465, 477 (2003) ("[B]y the mid-1990s, labor unions had replaced public pension funds as the
dominant institutional investors submitting shareholder proposals."); Stewart J. Schwab &
Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998) (describing union fund activism and use of shareholder proposals).
11. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with the assistance of Dana Kiku, Does the
Plaintiff Matter?: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1609 (2006) ("[Olur data contains no settlement where a bank, mutual
fund, or insurance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a securities class action."); Michael
Perino, InstitutionalActivism through Litigation:An EmpiricalAnalysis of Public Pension Fund
Participationin Securities Class Actions 11 n.5 (St. John's Legal Studies Research, Working
Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=938722 (describing large mutual
funds as "entirely absent from the ranks of lead plaintiffs").
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through free-riding, funds are surprisingly willing to participateeven funds that are unwilling to engage in non-litigation related
activity. This willingness to participate in litigation-related activity
undermines the notion that cost and a general preference against
activism fully explain fund passivity.
There are several possible explanations for the widespread
participation of public pension funds in litigation. One possibility is
that public pension funds are responding directly to Congress's
invitation for greater litigation participation, as embodied in the lead
plaintiff provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA"). 12 Public pension funds in particular may be
concerned about the legitimacy of shareholder activism. Such funds
may view the PSLRA as explicitly endorsing their service as lead
plaintiffs in a way that distinguishes that role from other types of
activism. Another possibility is that the legislation has mobilized
plaintiffs' law firms to encourage and facilitate fund involvement in
litigation and that these entrepreneurial efforts have spurred fund
participation. A third possibility is that litigation decisions are subject
to a different decisionmaking structure within the fund. Our
interviews suggest that litigation decisions may, in particular, be
subject to greater influence by the state Attorney General.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains our
methodology. Part II offers summary statistics about the responding
funds, a description of the types and levels of fund activism, and
summary statistics about fund voting structure and participation in
litigation. Part III describes our analysis of the data, including the
relationship between fund-specific characteristics and the level of
shareholder activism. We focus on testing the correlation between two
fund characteristics-fund size and fund passivity/delegation-and
activism levels, looking at both litigation and non-litigation activism.
Part IV considers the significance of our findings with respect to
current policy debates and offers some preliminary suggestions about
the manner in which our data may influence the design of corporate
governance structures.
I.

METHODOLOGY

Data collection for this project took place in three stages. The
first stage consisted of intensive multi-day interviews with two large
institutional investors. We conducted these interviews in the spring of
12. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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2005. Their purpose was to gain an understanding of the range of
institutional players, the types of activism in which those players
participated, the primary reasons for participation, and recent
developments and trends that have influenced the role of the
institutional investor.
Following these interviews, we developed a set of interview
questions designed for an in-person or telephone interview. Using
these questions, we conducted interviews with approximately twenty
institutional investors during the academic year 2005-06. The
institutions interviewed reflected a range of institution types,
including public pension funds, investment companies (mutual funds),
union funds, foundations, a university endowment, and a non-U.S.
institutional investor. Despite the use of a standard set of questions,
these interviews were relatively free-ranging, as we sought to learn
more about institutional practices as well as the extent to which
variations in activism were a function of institution type, as opposed
to other factors such as size, staff, and investment portfolio. We
collected information on fund practices, fund awareness of governance
issues and developments, and fund attitudes about corporate
governance.
The interviews rapidly demonstrated to us significant
differences between types of institutional investors. Our responders
identified several factors contributing to this variation, including
differences in regulation, market competition and constraints, staff
size and structure, and compensation structure. As a result, we
decided to focus the research reported in this Article on a single
institution type: public pension funds.
Using the results of our interviews, we constructed a new
survey designed specifically for public pension funds. The survey
collected information on a variety of general fund characteristics such
as size, portfolio composition, investment management structure, and
decisionmaking structure. It then collected detailed data on the funds'
participation in a total of twenty-seven types of non-litigation activism
activities and eleven types of litigation activism. We identified the
specific types of activism from activities described by our interviewees
as important for their institutions. The survey asked the funds to
identify their primary reasons for engaging in activism and the
primary reasons for their decision not to participate. The survey also
sought additional information on a variety of governance practices
including proxy voting and litigation claims processing.
We distributed the survey to 124 public pension funds by
regular mail and e-mail during the summer of 2006. Our sample
consisted of all the public pension funds whose attorney
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representatives were members of the National Association of Public
Pension Fund Attorneys ("NAPPA"). NAPPA is a membership
organization, limited to attorneys of public pension funds. Its "purpose
is to provide educational opportunities and informational resources for
its member attorneys." 13 Specifically, NAPPA is not a shareholder
activism or corporate governance organization. We selected the
NAPPA sample, in part, to reduce the risk of selection bias.
Of the 124 surveys we sent, we received responses from forty
public pension funds, giving us a response rate of approximately 32%.
Responding funds ranged in size from less than $1 billion in assets
under management to approximately $150 billion in assets. Our funds
came from twenty-five states plus the U.S. Virgin Islands. We closed
data collection in early December 2006 in order to avoid the risk that
differences in responses would be the result of developments
associated with the start of the 2007 proxy season. To test how
representative our responding funds were of the original set of 124
funds, we compared publicly available data on the fund assets of the
responding funds against the eighty-four non-responding funds from
our original sample. 14 For consistency, assets under management were
determined as of the end of the fund's prior fiscal year, which was
generally 2006. The mean asset size for responding funds was $25.4
billion, compared with $15.8 billion for non-responding funds. This
difference in the mean asset sizes was not statistically significant. The
lack of a statistically significant difference in fund asset size between
responding and non-responding funds supports the view that our
responding funds were representative of the entire set of surveyed
funds.
II. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
In this Part, we survey the evidence from our funds and make
some tentative observations about the nature of fund activism we
observe.
A. General Summary Statistics
Table 1(a) provides summary statistics on firm size and
investment structure. As indicated above, our responding sample
includes a representative range of the entire NAAPA set of funds with
13.

NAPPA Home Page, http://www.nappa.org/ (follow "Please Enter" link) (last visited Jan.

7, 2008).
14. Publicly available data were taken from annual reports and comparable documents,
which were generally available on the Internet.
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respect to fund size. CalPERS, which is currently the public pension
fund with the most assets under management, reported total assets
under management of $232 billion as of January 31, 2007.15
Table 1(a): General Summary Statistics
Firm Size
Assets
< $1 billion
1-10 billion
10-50 billion
50-100 billion
100-250 billion
Total

Number of Funds
2
14
17
4
2

Percent
5.1%
35.9%
43.6%
10.3%
5.1%

3916

100.0%

Investment Structure
Mean
Allocation of Assets
Fraction of Assets
Managed by External
Managers
Fraction of Assets
Indexed
Fraction of Assets in
U.S. Publicly Traded
Equity
Fraction of Assets in
U.S. Debt
Fraction of Assets in
International (NonU.S.)

25%

50%

75%

0.842

0.710

0.995

1.000

Std.
Dev.
0.250

0.292

0.110

0.300

0.390

0.200

0.435

0.397

0.435

0.482

0.082

0.247

0.204

0.250

0.300

0.083

0.203

0.163

0.200

0.232

0.075

A large percentage of public pension fund assets are managed
externally. As a result, the public pension fund represents a multilayered agency relationship in which the external managers,
themselves often institutional investors such as hedge funds or
mutual funds, are accountable to fund executives. The fund
15.

CalPERS Investment Facts at a Glance, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/

investme.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
16. One fund is excluded from this table due to inconsistent data on reported assets.
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executives, in turn, owe their ultimate fiduciary obligations to the
fund's beneficiaries. This multi-level relationship has received
relatively little attention from commentators. We find that, on
average, 84.2% of fund assets are managed externally. More
significantly, a substantial number of funds delegate corporate
governance responsibility, including voting authority, to their external
portfolio managers. 17 Table 1(b) illustrates this delegation.
Table 1(b): Reliance on Agents
Voting Methodology

Number of Funds

Percent

Vote Own Proxies

6

15.0%

Delegate Authority to Proxy Advisor
(Using Proxy Advisor's

8

20.0%

15

37.5%

11

27.5%

Total

40

100.0%

Preparation of Voting Guidelines

Number of Funds

Percent

Voting Guidelines Prepared In-House

23

57.5%

Voting Guidelines Outsourced (to Proxy
Advisor, External Fund Manager, or

17

42.5%

Total

40

100.0%

Claims Filing

Number of Funds

Percent

Claims Filing Done In-House

6

15.0%

Claims Filed by Custodian Bank or

34

85.0%

40

100.0%

Recommendation)

Delegate Authority to Proxy Advisor
(Using Fund's Guidelines)

Delegate Authority to External Portfolio
Manager

Other Outside Party)

Claims Processing Service

Total

17. We note that 69% of our funds retain ISS as their proxy advisor, a statistic that may
raise concerns about the extent of ISS's influence over institutional voting decisions.
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Primary Mechanism

to

Become

Number of Funds

325

Percent

Aware of Litigation

_

Outside Law Firm/Retained

15

62.5%

6

25.0%

Internal Monitoring

2

8.3%

Other

1

4.2%

Total

24

100.0%

Counsel/Outside Monitoring Law Firm

Litigation Monitoring Service/Investor
Responsibility Support Services
("IRSS")

Public pension fund reliance on agents extends beyond external
fund managers. As reported in Table 1(b), we find that pension funds
rely heavily on a variety of agents for services ranging from proxy
voting and the preparation of voting guidelines to claims filing and
securities litigation screening. Significantly, we find that funds devote
limited internal resources to corporate governance, including, as is
detailed further below, oversight of their agents. Our interviews
revealed that many funds do not dedicate even a single full-time staff
position to corporate governance. Similarly, of the funds in our survey,
only 17.5% have a separate budget for funding participation in
corporate governance.
Another interesting fact revealed by our data is that public
pension funds engage in indexed investing to a lesser degree than is
sometimes assumed. We find that the average fund indexes only
29.2% of its assets. This is in marked contrast to TIAA-CREF, for
example, which indexes 80% of its assets.1 8 The argument that an
indexed institution has a greater incentive to focus on monitoring
because it is locked into the market and cannot discipline issuers
through exit 1 9 would seem to apply to our sample of public pension
funds only to a limited extent. Moreover, the failure to index means
that fund resources are devoted to attempting to improve returns
through investment rather than governance decisions.

18. TIAA-CREF, Life Funds Prospectus 47 (May 1, 2007), http://www.tiaa-cref.org/pdf/
prospectuses/spia.pdf.
19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1366 (1991) (explaining why monitoring might be
rational for indexed institutional investors, namely because they are locked into the market).
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B. Non-LitigationActivism
Observing non-litigation related fund activity is often difficult.
Some activities, such as publicly announcing a fund's votes prior to a
shareholder meeting, are public. Others are less visible, such as when
a fund writes a letter to management or informally suggests
candidates for the board of directors to a company's nominating
committee. Our survey method allows us to obtain information on both
more public and less visible forms of non-litigation activism.
Table 2 contains the core of our survey results-statistics about
fund participation in twenty-seven categories of non-litigation
activism. We identified the activities contained in Table 2 through our
interviews of institutional investors. They include the universe of nonlitigation forms of corporate governance activism in which various
types of institutional investors, including public pension funds and
other institutions, described themselves as participating. In our
survey, funds were asked to indicate whether they participated in that
activity and, if so, to characterize their activity level as done either
''occasionally" or "frequently."
Table 2: Non-Litigation Related Activism Summary
Statistics
Activity
Writing Letters to
Management
Meeting with
Management
Communicating with
Other Institutions
Regarding Corporate
Governance
Soliciting Support for
Activities from Other
Institutions (Building
Coalitions)
Participating in
Corporate Governance
Organizations
Participating in
Corporate Governance
Programs

Never Done
53.9%

Occasionally
30.8%

Frequently
15.4%

64.1%

20.5%

15.4%

25.0%

50.0%

25.0%

47.5%

35.0%

17.5%

30.0%

27.5%

42.5%

37.5%

27.5%

35.0%
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75.0%
Sponsoring Corporate
Governance Programs
82.5%
Sponsoring Shareholder
Proposal
85.0%
Soliciting Votes on
Shareholder Proposal
100.0%
Formally Nominating
Director Candidate in
Opposition to
I
Management
71.8%
Participating in Proxy
Contest in Support of
Other Non-Management
Nominees
90.0%
Submitting Names of
Director Candidates to
Nominating Committee
87.5%
Informally Suggesting
to
Director Candidates
CEO or Other Board
Members
42.5%
Withholding Votes from
Management Director
Candidate
85.0%
Publicly Announcing
Vote Prior to
Shareholder Meeting
57.5%
Recalling Loaned Stock
for Voting
75.0%
Requesting SEC
Rulemaking
50.0%
Writing Comment
Letter to SEC
Signing Comment Letter 42.5%
to SEC (as Part of
Group)
75.0%
Participating in SEC
Hearing or Roundtable

17.5%

7.5%

15.0%

2.5%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%

0.0%

28.2%

0.0%

10.0%

0.0%

12.5%

0.0%

22.5%

35.0%

10.0%

5.0%

27.5%

15.0%

17.5%

7.5%

35.0%

15.0%

47.5%

10.0%

22.5%

2.5%
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Lobbying Congress
(Formally or Informally)
with Respect to
Corporate Governance
Lobbying State
Legislature(s) with
Respect to Corporate
Governance
Participating in Bar
Association Activities
with Respect to
Corporate Governance
Targeted Investing

72.5%

27.5%

0.0%

80.0%

20.0%

0.0%

67.5%

30.0%

2.5%

76.9%

20.5%

2.6%

Creating Focus Lists for
Activism
Submitting Amicus
Brief on Corporate or
Securities Issue
Issuing Press Release
with Respect to Any
Corporate Governance
Activities

87.5%

2.5%

10.0%

71.8%

25.6%

2.6%

72.5%

22.5%

5.0%

The results show substantial variation among activities. As
Table 2 indicates, there are seven activities in which 50% or more of
our funds reported participating. Several of these activities involve
interacting with other institutional investors through coalition
building, participation in corporate governance organizations and
programs, and communicating with fellow institutional investors.
More than half of our funds report writing or signing comment letters
to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Additionally,
57.5% of our funds reported withholding votes from director elections.
It is worth noting that all of these activities are relatively low
cost, making them feasible options for institutions that do not have
resources expressly devoted to corporate governance. In addition,
these activities do not involve the funds in visible public
confrontations with management. Because public pension funds do not
have to report their votes publicly, for example, it is difficult for
management to identify and challenge specific funds for withholding

2008]

ON BEYOND CalPERS

329

votes against a director candidate. 20 In addition, the widespread use of
director withhold votes among institutional investors and their
frequent recommendation by proxy advisory firms have made
withhold votes relatively common and reduced the political or media
21
risk associated with this form of investor activism.
Activism addressed to specific companies is far less common.
Despite media reports that institutional investors engage in frequent
direct communication with company management, we find that 53.9%
of our funds never submitted a letter to management, and 64.1% never
met with management.2 2 More openly confrontational activity is even
less frequent; fewer than 20% of funds had submitted a shareholder
proposal or actively engaged in the solicitation of proxies. Fewer than
15% of our funds had followed the CalPERS model of identifying
activism targets through the use of focus lists.23 And, importantly,
funds almost never are involved in actively challenging management
control over the nomination and election of directors. None of our
funds reported nominating a director candidate, and fewer than 15%
had even submitted the name of a potential director candidate to a
board member, CEO, or nominating committee.
Finally, funds reported relatively little involvement in
policymaking. Only 20% of funds had lobbied their state legislatures
with respect to corporate governance even occasionally, and only
27.5% had lobbied Congress. To the extent that funds are concerned
with policymaking, they are more likely to engage with the SEC; as
indicated above, more than half the funds reported communicating
with the SEC through comment letters or testimony. This is consistent
with our interview findings in which the majority of institutional
investors identified the SEC as the government agency most
responsive to the needs of institutional investors. Finally, only 28.1%
of funds reported submitting an amicus brief on a corporate or
securities issue, although that number may have increased, as a

20. Nonetheless, some public pension funds voluntarily disclose their votes. For example,
CalPERS provides its proxy voting on the web at Proxy Voting Decisions, http://www.calpersgovernance.org/alertproxy/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). In addition, management sometimes can
track withhold votes based on broker voting.
21. See Patrick G. Quick, John K. Wilson & Jessica S. Lochmann, Recent Developments
Regarding Majority Voting in Director Elections, WALL ST. LAW., Jan. 2006, available at
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/wsl/wslO106.html (describing the significance of withhold
votes among institutional investors).
22. One explanation for this is the fact that many public pension funds delegate
responsibility for corporate governance to their external portfolio managers. It is possible, even
likely, that those portfolio managers engage in meetings with corporate management or write
letters in connection with their investment decision-making.
23. See Press Release, CalPERS, supranote 2 (describing CalPERS's focus list strategy).
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number of public pension funds signed on to amicus briefs in recent
24
Supreme Court cases addressing securities fraud litigation.
C. LitigationActivism
With the adoption of the PSLRA and the creation of the lead
plaintiff provision, institutional investors and public pension funds in
particular have become increasingly active, serving as lead plaintiffs
in a higher percentage of cases every year and, on occasion, taking a
visible role in selecting counsel and negotiating aggressive fee
agreements. In some cases, institutions exert even more control. 25 For
example, the New York State public pension funds, under the
leadership of state comptroller Alan Hevesi, were the driving force
behind requiring individual outside directors to contribute personal
funds to the settlement of the WorldCom litigation. 26 The University
27
of California negotiated a similar provision in the Enron settlement.
At the same time, concerns about delay, procedural obstacles,
and, in some cases, lack of control over the selection of lead counsel
have led some institutional investors to opt out of class litigation in
favor of pursuing individual cases. 28 Institutional investors also
24. See, e.g., Brief of the N.Y. State Common Retirement Fund et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007) (No.
06-484), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 226 (providing an example of public pension funds signing
onto amicus briefs in cases addressing securities fraud litigation).
25. We both have written extensively about the participation of institutional investors in
litigation, particularly in securities fraud class action litigation. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E.
Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead PlaintiffProvision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 888-89 (2005) (analyzing the
participation of institutional investors in litigation over a ten-year period); Stephen J. Choi &
Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Era After
the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1503-07, 1518-30 (2006) (assessing the effects of the
PSLRA on institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in class actions); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the
Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650,
654-55 (2002) (describing the role and selection of lead counsel in class action litigation).
26. See The Director's Cut, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A12 (reporting a statement by
Hevesi that he "felt personally that this would be unfair and not a deterrent for future failures
on the part of directors if they weren't held personally liable").
27. Press Release, Univ. of Cal., UC Reaches $168-Million Settlement with Enron Directors
in Securities Fraud Case (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/
2005/jan07.html.
28. See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert, Fractured Class Actions: "Opt-Outs" Are a Growing
Headache for Companies, BUS. WK., Feb. 27, 2006, at 31 (describing pension fund opt-outs in
several major cases). In some cases, institutional investors have recovered substantially more
through individual litigation. See, e.g., Gilbert Chan, CaIPERS' Time Strategy Pays Off: The
State Pension Fund Gets $117.7 Million After Opting Out of Class-Action Suit Against Media
Giant, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 15, 2007, at D4 (reporting that by opting out CalPERS received a
recovery in Time-Warner litigation that was seventeen times what it would have received by
remaining as a member of the class action).
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occasionally participate in other types of litigation, such as state court
29
derivative suits and appraisal proceedings.
We sought to obtain information about public pension fund
participation in various types of litigation. For those funds that
participated, we sought to gain a greater understanding of the nature
of their involvement. Table 3 contains summary statistics for litigation
activism. As the table shows, activism levels are significantly higher
for litigation than for non-litigation activity. Fifty-five percent of
responding funds, for example, reported that they had served as lead
plaintiff. These findings are consistent with data showing increasing
involvement by institutional investors in shareholder litigation.
Cornerstone Research, for example, reported that more than half of all
30
suits settled in 2006 had institutional investors as lead plaintiffs.
Table 3: Litigation Activism Summary Statistics
Activity

Percent of Funds That Engaged
in Activity at Least Once

Served as Lead Plaintiff in
Securities Litigation
Served as Lead Plaintiff in

55.0%
15.0%

Derivative Litigation

Opted out of Class Action and
Pursued Individual Securities

60.0%

Fraud or Derivative Suit

Competed with Another Institution
for Lead Plaintiff Role
Informally Participated in
Litigation
Attempted Unsuccessfully to Serve

55.0%
32.5%
35.0%

as Lead Plaintiff

Participated in Litigation over
Shareholder Proposals
Sought Appraisal Remedy
Other Corporate/Securities
Litigation

2.5%
2.5%
10.0%
1_1

29. See Fisch, supra note 25, at 724 (noting that institutions have participated actively in
some derivative suits).
30. See Beth Barr, Securities Class Action Settlements Reach Record Level, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
29, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l175159036321 (reporting results of
Cornerstone study).
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Objected to Proposed Settlement

5.0%

Objected to Proposed/Requested
Attorney Fee Award

25.0%
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As media reports indicate, opting out of shareholder litigation
to pursue an individual claim is relatively common. 31 Table 3 reports
that 60% of funds reported opting out of representative litigation.
Funds appear to believe that they will recover more money and receive
payment more quickly when they opt out.3 2 The media report that
opting out has been a successful strategy in several high profile
cases. 33 Nonetheless, in the interviews, some institutions reported
frustration with opting out.
Funds are much less active in other types of litigation. Only a
small fraction of funds reported participating in derivative suits,
appraisal proceedings, and litigation over shareholder proposals.
Lower participation levels in these forms of litigation activism may be
driven, in part, by the fact that legal fees may not be available out of
the resulting common fund as they are in class actions.
We also asked funds about the manner in which they processed
securities litigation claims. Our questioning on this topic was
motivated by highly publicized research by James Cox and Randall
Thomas reporting that institutional investors failed to file claim forms
in securities litigation at an alarmingly high rate, leaving billions of
dollars "on the table." 34 When Cox and Thomas's research was
released, more than forty mutual fund managers were sued for failing
to file claims forms on behalf of their funds. 35 It appears that public
pension funds have responded to the Cox and Thomas research and

31. See Woellert, supra note 28 (describing a number of pension fund opt-outs).
32. See, e.g., Neil L. Selinger, Why Funds Opt Out of Class Action, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, Feb. 20, 2006, at 12 (explaining that opting out can result in "substantial
premiums over the class recovery" as well as "an expeditious payment").
33. See, e.g., Woellert, supra note 28 (reporting recoveries by opt outs in Time Warner,
WorldCom, and other big securities fraud cases).
34. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 856-60 (2002);
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical
Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in
Securities ClassAction Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 425 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas,
Letting Billions]. Cox and Thomas researched filings by "financial institutions," which they
defined to include "private and public pension funds, life and casualty insurance companies,
mutual funds, bank trust departments, and various endowments," but did not focus specifically
on public pension funds. Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions, supraat 415.
35. See Securities Litigation Watch, http://slw.riskmetrics.com (Jan. 25, 2005) (under
Archives, select "January 2005") (describing litigation against mutual funds).
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the admonition that filing claims is one of their fiduciary obligations.
However, the procedures by which funds handle claims submission
varies; as reported above in Table 1(b), 85% outsource the process,
either to their securities custodian or to a claims processing firm, and
36
15% handle claims processing internally.
An important question is whether the recoveries in investor
litigation are significant. 37 We find that funds in our sample reported
recovering an average of $6.75 million in the prior fiscal year, an
amount that represents 0.035% of the average fund's total assets
(although the recovery obviously may have a more substantial effect
on returns). There is considerable variation in fund recoveries,
ranging from 0.209% of fund assets down to 0.003% of assets. In
addition, recoveries in securities fraud class actions have grown
substantially in the past 5 years. Nonetheless, for many funds, it
remains an open question as to whether litigation recoveries are
economically significant. Interestingly, 25% of funds reported that
they do not maintain information on their litigation recoveries. One
can question whether a fund is meeting its fiduciary obligations if it
does not even keep track of whether and to what extent it is
recovering money on its securities claims.
D. MeasuringActivism
In order to measure activism levels and to test those levels
against fund-specific factors such as size, we constructed three
activism indices. The first index, which measures non-litigation
activism, is based on the information contained in Table 2. For each
sample fund, we assigned a value of 1 for occasional participation in
each non-litigation activity and a value of 2 for frequent participation
in that activity. Summing those numbers for each sample fund gives

36. An increasing number of firms are offering funds the opportunity to outsource their
claims processing. One of the best known is Securities Class Action Services (SCAS), a subsidiary
of ISS. For a description of services provided by SCAS, see Institutional Shareholder Services,
Securities Class Action Services: Recover Your Clients' Eligible Assets with Securities Class
Action Services, available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/securitiesclass.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2008). SCAS reported that, in the year 2006, it filed more than 160,000 claims on behalf of its
clients. Id. Claims filing is also offered by IRSS. Investor Responsibility Support Services, Inc.,
About IRSS, https://www.irss.ws/about.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2008). Plaintiffs' law firms are
also offering claims processing. See, e.g., Coughlin Stoia, News, Lerach Coughlin takes on
Securities Claims Filing (Mar. 3, 2007) http://www.csgrr.comcsgrr-cgibin/mil?templ=news/
articles/securitiesclaimsfiling.html (highlighting the claims filing services for institutional
clients Coughlin Stoia (formerly Lerach Coughlin) introduced last year).
37. See Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883-84 (2002) (raising this
question in the context of the Cox and Thomas research).
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us the non-litigation index, which can range from 0 to a maximum of
54.
The second index measures litigation activism. For each
litigation activity listed in Table 4, we assigned a value of 1 if the fund
indicated that it participated in the specific activity at least once. The
litigation index for each sample fund is the sum across all the various
litigation activity categories, which can range from 0 to 11.
Lastly, to measure overall activism, we constructed a combined
activism index. To give equal weight to each non-litigation and
litigation activity, we assigned a value of 1 for each activity that a
fund indicated that it had performed at least once. Thus, unlike for
the Non-Litigation Sum variable, where each activity can range from 0
to 2, we treat each activity for purposes of constructing the Activism
index as ranging from 0 to 1. The activism index is the sum of the
values assigned to each activity-both non-litigation and litigationfor each fund and can range from 0 to 38. Table 4 reports summary
statistics on our three measures of fund activity. We use these
measures of activism in the next Part to test the extent to which fundspecific characteristics correlate with activism levels.
Table 4
Measures of Activity

Mean

25%

50%

75%

Std. Dev.

Non-Litigation Sum

11.675

4.500

8.500

16.500

10.866

Litigation Sum

2.975

1.000

3.000

4.000

2.166

Activism

12.000

6.000

11.500

17.000

8.735

III. FUND-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS AND LEVELS OF ACTIVISM
We test the relationship between various characteristics of a
fund and the level of activism in which a fund engages. Our tests focus
on two hypotheses on how fund characteristics may relate to activism.
First, we test the relationship of fund size with activism. We
hypothesize that size will correlate with a greater inclination to
engage in activism. Larger funds are better able to spread the fixed
costs of researching corporate governance issues, participating in
proxy contests, and so on. Specifically, we test whether size is equally
important for both non-litigation and litigation-related activism.
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Second, we hypothesize that funds that delegate more of their
functions will engage in less activism. Funds that delegate more
functions will have fewer in-house resources with which to engage in
activism. Similarly, delegation may reflect a structural preference
against outside actions, including activism. We test in particular
whether the delegation of functions correlates with levels of litigation
and non-litigation activism.
A. Fund Size and Activism
The costs of engaging in activism are largely fixed. The costs of
serving as lead plaintiff in a securities class action are roughly the
same whether the plaintiff is a small or large fund. The costs of
soliciting proxies for a shareholder proposal do not vary with the size
of the fund. Given the mostly fixed costs of activism, larger funds have
an economic advantage in pursuing activism. Large funds are able to
spread the cost of activism across this larger asset base. In addition,
large funds are likely to have larger staffs and budgets, making it
easier for the funds to devote a portion of both to activism. Even
relatively small activism costs may overwhelm the operating budget of
smaller funds.
Because of the cost advantage accruing to larger funds, we
predict that larger funds will engage in more activism. We define
"Small Funds" as funds with assets less than $10 billion. Large
Funds" are defined as funds with $10 billion or more in assets. Table 5
explores in more detail the relationship between fund size and
activism. We report the p-value from a t-test of the difference in the
means between small funds and large funds.
Table 5: Fund Size and Activism

Writing Letters to Management

Small
Funds
0.133

Large
Funds
0.917

pvalue
0.001

Meeting with Management

0.400

0.583

0.469

Communicating with other Institutions
Regarding Corporate Governance
Soliciting Support from Other Institutions
(Building Coalitions)
Participating in Corporate Governance
Organizations

0.688

1.208

0.022

0.438

0.875

0.073

0.625

1.458
I_

0.002
II

Non-Litigation Activity

I
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Participating in Corporate Governance
Programs
Sponsoring Corporate Governance Programs

0.563

1.250

0.012

0.000

0.542

0.005

Sponsoring Shareholder Proposal

0.000

0.333

0.024

Soliciting Votes on Shareholder Proposal

0.125

0.250

0.460

Formally Nominating Director Candidate in
Opposition to Management
Participating in Proxy Contest in Support of
Other Non-Management Nominees
Submitting Names of Director Candidates to
Nominating Committee
Informally Suggesting Director Candidates
to CEO or Other Board Members
Withholding Votes from Management
Director Candidate
Publicly Announcing Vote Prior to
Shareholders' Meeting
Recalling Loaned Stock for Voting

0.000

0.000

0.200

0.333

0.381

0.000

0.167

0.089

0.000

0.208

0.053

0.563

1.167

0.033

0.188

0.208

0.902

0.188

0.833

0.006

Requesting SEC Rulemaking

0.000

0.542

0.005

Writing Comment Letter to SEC

0.250

0.917

0.004

Signing Comment Letter to SEC (as Part of a
Group)
Participating in SEC Hearing or Roundtable

0.438

0.833

0.061

0.000

0.458

0.004

Lobbying Congress (Formally or Informally)
on Corporate Governance
Lobbying State Legislature(s) on Corporate
Governance
Participating in Bar Association Activities
with Respect to Corporate Governance
Targeted Investing

0.188

0.333

0.324

0.125

0.250

0.345

0.188

0.458

0.117

0.067

0.375

0.059

Creating Focus Lists for Activism

0.000

0.375

0.060

Submitting Amicus Brief on Corporate or
Securities Issue
Issuing Press Release with Respect to Any of
Your Corporate Governance Activities
Non-litigation sum

0.200

0.375

0.314

0.125

0.458

0.071

5.625

15.708

0.003
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We find that, for virtually every type of non-litigation activism,
large funds are significantly more active than small funds. In
addition, the Non-Litigation Sum measure is significantly greater for
large funds as compared with small funds.
What drove fund participation in non-litigation activism? Table
6 gives a breakdown of the primary reasons for participation and nonparticipation as indicated by our responding funds.
Table 6: Reasons for Non-Litigation Activism
Reason for
Participating
Improved Returns

Number of Funds

Percentage

14

38.9%

Fiduciary Duties

4

11.1%

Significant Public
Interest
Other

4

11.1%

6

16.7%

Did Not Participate

8

22.2%

Total

36

100.0%

Note: "Other" includes the fund board required more activity to become aware of
corporate governance issues, among others.

Reason for Not
Participating
Lack of Resources

Number of Funds

Percentage

16

44.4%

Cost-Benefit Analysis
Against Participation
Lack of Authority; Not
Authorized by Trustee
or Board; Reluctance of
Trustee or Board to
Become Active
Other
Total

11

30.6%

6

16.7%

3
36

8.3%
100.0%

Note: "Other" includes delegation of participation decisions to external managers, the
desire to avoid potentially contentious issues, and the desire to avoid getting entangled
in openly public "headline" activism.
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Note that 38.9% of funds gave "improved returns" as their
primary reason, constituting 50% of those funds that reported some
form of participation. Lack of resources was the most common reason
for not participating.
In contrast to the difference in non-litigation activism based on
the size of the fund, we find no such size difference for litigationrelated activism. Table 7 reports the fund responses to several
categories of litigation-related activism. We report the p-value from a
t-test of the difference in the fraction of small funds and large funds.
Table 7
p-value

Fraction
of Small

Fraction
of Large

Funds

Funds

0.500

0.583

0.615

0.063

0.208

0.216

0.438

0.708

0.091

0.625

0.500

0.449

Informally Participated in Litigation

0.313

0.333

0.894

Attempted Unsuccessfully to Serve as

0.313

0.375

0.694

0.000

0.042

0.421

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.188

0.043
0.167
0.083
0.292

0.412
0.089
0.247
0.469

2.438

3.333

0.204

Litigation Activity

Served as Lead Plaintiff in Securities
Litigation
Served as Lead Plaintiff in Derivative
Litigation

Opted out of Class Action and
Pursued Individual Securities Fraud
or Derivative Suit

Competed with Another Institution
for Lead Plaintiff Role

Lead Plaintiff

Participated in Litigation over
Shareholder Proposal

Sought Appraisal Remedy
Other Corporate/Securities Litigation
Objected to Proposed Settlement
Objected to Proposed/Requested
Attorney Fee Award

Litigation Sum

Large funds opted out of class actions to pursue their own
individual securities fraud or derivative suits more often than small
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funds. 38 Large funds also responded that they engaged in other forms
of corporate or securities litigation more frequently than small funds.
Both differences, however, are significant at only the 10% confidence
level. Outside of these two areas, none of the differences in the other
litigation activity categories are significant. Moreover, the overall
Litigation Sum score for small funds is not significantly different than
the score for large funds.
What explained a fund's decision to become active in litigation?
We asked our sample funds why they sought appointment as lead
plaintiffs. Among those funds that responded that they had sought the
lead plaintiff position, Table 8 gives a breakdown of their primary
reasons for participation. Table 8 also delineates the primary reasons
for non-participation among funds that did not seek lead plaintiff
status.
Table 8
Reason Sought Lead Plaintiff Position
Large Losses; Large Size of Recovery
To Increase Recovery Amount; Affect
Settlement; Deter Misconduct
Particularly Egregious Fraud on the Merits
Fiduciary Responsibility
Other
Total

Number of
Funds
17
4

Percentage

2
1
2
26

7.7%
3.9%
7.7%
100.0%

65.4%
15.4%

Note: "Other" includes the recommendation of the state Attorney General to pursue lead
plaintiff appointment, among other reasons.

Reason Did Not Seek Lead Plaintiff
Position
Insufficient Resources; Drain on Resources
Other Funds with Larger Losses
No Merit; No Worthwhile Suit

Number of
Funds
7
6
2

Percentage
43.8%
37.5%
12.5%

Other
Total

1
16

6.3%
100.0%

Note: "Other" includes opposition from fund trustees, among other reasons given from the
same fund.

38. Given that opting out of a class action is economically rational only for a class member
with a relatively large stake, this finding is not surprising.
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By far the most important reason for the decision to seek lead
plaintiff status is the size of the loss and corresponding size of the
potential litigation recovery. Funds are concerned with the bottom line
in pursuing litigation activism.
Importantly, our findings reveal that litigation is not
dominated by a subset of only the larger funds. Given the focus on the
bottom line, what explains this lack of size differential for litigationrelated activism? One possible explanation is that litigation tends to
generate a large amount of publicity. Regardless of size, public
pension funds may engage in litigation-related activism precisely
because of this publicity. Specifically, pension funds that face political
pressure from external sources, such as the state Attorney General,
may decide to engage in litigation activism even if they normally
eschew non-litigation activism.
A second possibility is that litigation activism, particularly
service as lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action, does not
impose substantial costs on a fund. Despite the common response of
insufficient resources on the part of funds that did not seek lead
plaintiff status, plaintiffs' firms typically bring these cases on a
contingency fee basis, and funds incur no out-of-pocket costs other
than the expenditure of time by fund personnel to monitor the case.
Indeed, plaintiffs' firms typically screen cases and identify pension
funds with substantial stakes, so that funds need not incur
investigation costs. The lower cost of litigation activism may make it
accessible to firms that lack the resources for other types of
governance.
A third possibility is that participation in litigation may not
always constitute activism. Although some public pension funds take
an active role when they serve as lead plaintiff-monitoring counsel,
negotiating a fee agreement, overseeing litigation strategy, and so
forth 39-others may not. One of the criticisms of securities fraud class
representatives prior to the adoption of the PSLRA was their relative
passivity in overseeing the litigation. 40 The mere fact that a lead
plaintiff is a public pension fund rather than an individual is not a
guarantee of greater oversight. Recent studies suggest that public

39. See Fisch, supra note 25, at 704-10 (describing the active involvement of institutional
investors in selecting lead counsel, negotiating fee agreements, and monitoring litigation); R.
Randall Roche, My Experience as a Lead Plaintiff, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOCATE, at 1
(2000), http://www.blbglaw.com/advocate/adv2000Q4.pdf (describing the author's role as general
counsel for the Louisiana Retirement Systems in monitoring the litigation against 3Com).
40. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053,
2054 (1995) (describing such plaintiffs as "figurehead" plaintiffs).
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pension fund involvement as lead plaintiff is correlated with greater
settlement amounts and lower attorneys' fees, 41 but those studies
cannot determine the frequency with which funds participate actively.
Moreover, it is possible that public pension funds simply cherry pick
the stronger securities suits; the higher recovery amounts may not be
due to any added value from fund participation, but may reflect the
ability of funds to select higher value suits with which to become
42
involved.
A fourth explanation is that fund losses may not be correlated
with fund size. A small fund may have a substantial loss in a
particular issuer, justifying its involvement in litigation. 43 Indeed,
such a fund may have a greater incentive to participate in the
litigation than a larger fund to the extent that its losses are, relative
to its overall portfolio, economically significant.
B. Delegationand Activism
We hypothesize that funds that delegate more of their
functions have fewer resources in-house to devote to activism.
Delegating may indicate a preference for greater passivity that
corresponds to lower levels of activism. Importantly, however,
delegation also exposes funds to an agency problem: outside parties
assisting funds in investment decisions (i.e., active portfolio managers)
and voting decisions (i.e., ISS) may not necessarily make decisions in
the best interests of the fund. Active portfolio managers, for example,
simply may prefer to exit from poorly performing investments rather
than attempt to improve corporate governance. Because, as suggested
above, the factors that seem to drive litigation activism differ from
non-litigation activism, we also hypothesize that a fund that delegates
will not necessarily display the same lack of activity for litigation as
for non-litigation related activity.
As discussed above, funds choose to delegate many of their
activities (see Table 1(b) above). We focus on three specific acts of
delegation: (1) voting, (2) the preparation of voting guidelines, and (3)
the processing of claims in securities litigation. We do not include the
decision to delegate litigation screening because the significance of
this variable is compromised by firms that do not participate in

41. Cox & Thomas, supra note 11, at 1636-39; Perino, supra note 11, at 24, 30-31.
42. See Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 25, at 892 (finding some empirical evidence
consistent with the "cherry-picking" hypothesis).
43. The likelihood of this event is increased to the extent that funds are stock picking rather
than indexing.

342

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:315

litigation. We focus only on those decisions to delegate that are not
related directly to our measures of non-litigation and litigation
activism in order to avoid endogeneity problems. Whether a fund is
engaged in one of our areas of activism, the fund will make separate
decisions about the development of its voting guidelines, whether to
delegate its decision to vote, and whether to outsource its claims
processing.
We take the decision to delegate in the areas of voting,
development of voting guidelines, and claims processing as a proxy for
the exogenous preference of the fund to outsource those activities as
opposed to undertaking them in-house (with a corresponding
commitment to fund them. "Delegation" is defined as follows: a score
of 1 is given for each of the three delegations described above, and the
sum is Delegation (so the score can range from 0 to 3).
(1) The fund describes its method of voting as (a) delegate voting
authority to a proxy advisor in accordance with its recommendations, (b)
do not vote, or (c) delegation to outside managers
(2) The fund outsources the preparation of voting guidelines
(3) The fund outsources the processing of its securities litigation claims
Our hypothesis is that a fund with a preference to delegate (as proxied
through our Delegation variable) will choose not to engage in activism.
Table 9 reports summary statistics on the Delegation measure.
Table 9: Passive and Active Funds Summary Statistics
Measures of Activity
Delegation

Mean
1.7

25%
0.0

50%
1.5

75%
3.0

Std. Dev.
1.027

Relationship with Activism
Delegation
> Median
8.48

p-value

Activism

Delegation
5__
Median
15.55

Non-Litigation Activism

16.35

7.00

0.005

Litigation Activism

3.30

2.65

0.349

0.008

Note: p-value is for a t-test of the difference in means between the Delegation < Median
group and the Delegation > Median group.
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Funds that choose to delegate more functions are likely to
devote less effort and fewer resources to developing in-house
knowledge and expertise about corporate governance. We find that
funds that choose to delegate engage in far less non-litigation activity
as compared with other funds (difference significant at the 1%
significance level). Funds that delegate also engage in less nonlitigation activity, but the difference is not statistically significant.
C. Multivariate Tests
Our tests above examine the correlation between fund activism
and (a) size and (b) a preference for passivity. To further test the
differences between litigation and non-litigation activism, we perform
a series of multivariate models to control for other factors that may
affect a fund's level of activism.
Our models use one of two dependent variables based on our
measures of fund activism: Non-Litigation Sum or Litigation Sum.
Because both dependent variables are discrete and ordinal, we use an
ordered logit model.
In each of our models, we include three control variables. The
first control is the fraction of the fund's portfolio that is externally
managed (Fraction Externally Managed). Funds with external
managers may not take as close an interest in the corporate
governance of the corporations in which they invest. The second
control is the fraction of the fund's portfolio in the form of U.S.
publicly traded equity (Fraction Equity U.S.). Funds with more assets
in U.S. publicly traded equity may have a greater incentive to engage
in activism within the United States to boost the value of this equity.
Our third control is the fraction of a fund's assets that is indexed, as
opposed to actively managed (Fraction Equity Index). The greater the
fraction of indexed funds, the less incentive a fund may have to
improve the corporate governance at any one particular company. On
the other hand, indexed funds may be more active because they cannot
respond to poor governance through exit.
To test the impact of size, we include fund assets in each
regression. To test the relationship between delegation and activism,
we include the Delegation variable. Lastly, we include an indicator
variable, Public Official Decisionmaker, to test whether having a
public official in direct decisionmaking authority for a fund results in
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greater activism. 44 Public Official Decisionmaker is defined as equal to
1 if a fund responded that decisionmaking authority is vested in an
45
elected or appointed public official and 0 otherwise.
Table 10 reports the results from our multivariate tests.
Table 10
Model 1

Model 2

Non-Litigation Sum

Litigation Sum

Assets

0.075***
(3.860)

0.012
(1.000)

Delegation

-0.781**
(-1.990)

-0.125
(-0.330)

Public Official
Decisionmaker

2.949*
(1.780)

0.701
(0.550)

Fraction Externally
Managed

-2.235
(-1.130)

-2.497
(-1.510)

Fraction Equity U.S.

-3.939
(-0.890)

-10.031**
(-2.190)

Fraction Equity Index

-4.476**
(-2.260)

0.388
(0.230)

N

38

38

Log Likelihood

-87.981

-71.282

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables

***1%, **5%, *10% significance level. z-statistic in parentheses.

44. The degree of oversight exercised by a public official may differ from that official's legal
authority. Because we are concerned with actual involvement rather than the legal right to
exercise oversight, we code based on the official's involvement as reported by our sample funds.
45. Most of our funds did not report a public official as the decisionmaker. Instead, we
found that 90% of our funds were governed by a board of governors, trustees, or directors. This
finding is consistent with Schneider, who states that the majority of public pension funds are
administered by a board. Schneider, supra note 8, at 110. Our interview data revealed that board
composition varies significantly. Some boards contain a number of public officials, some contain
primarily current or retired plan members, and some contain a number of independent members
similar to the outside directors of corporations. Our survey, however, did not request information
on the board composition of responding funds; nor did it allow us to determine the extent to
which boards are likely to be influenced by local politics.
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Note from Table 10 the lack of correlation between fund size
and litigation activism. 46 Unlike non-litigation activism, litigation
draws equally from large and small firms. This finding is noteworthy
in light of the fact that the funds most commonly explain their lack of
activism (both litigation and non-litigation) as the result of their small
size and limited resources. Our results are consistent with the recent
report by Cornerstone Research, indicating that the funds most active
in litigation in 2006, by number of lawsuits, were Teachers'
Retirement System of Louisiana ($14 billion in assets), Local 144
Nursing Home Pension Fund ($8.2 billion including several other
funds), Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund ($4.3 billion),
Louisiana School Employees Retirement System ($1.5 billion), and the
Louisiana State Employees Retirement System ($7.8 billion).
Similar to our univariate results, Delegation correlates with a
lesser degree of Non-Litigation activism (at the 1% significance level).
In contrast, Delegation does not correlate with a lesser degree of
litigation activism. Funds appear to distinguish between non-litigation
and litigation-related activities. Funds that perform fewer functions
in-house are not more limited in their litigation-related activities.
Table 10 reports that funds with an appointed or elected public
official as the decisionmaker engage in greater non-litigation activism
(significant at the 10% level). It is unclear whether such public
decisionmakers are motivated by shareholder or public welfare or
simply seeking to increase their personal visibility, possibly to further
the goal of attaining higher office. Under the civic republicanism view
of the political process, the involvement of public officials should
increase accountability and lead to socially desirable levels of
participation in corporate governance.4 7 On the other hand, some
commentators have accused public officials of using pension fund
activism to pursue political objectives that are inconsistent with the

46. Despite this finding, there remains a substantial degree of correlation between nonlitigation activism and litigation activism. The correlation coefficient was equal to 0.6598.
47. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political
Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1611 (2006) (describing civic
republicanism); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
562 (2000) (explaining that "civic republicanism portrays government as a moral force for the
common good").
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financial interests of fund beneficiaries. 48 Our data provide no bases
49
for testing between those competing hypotheses.
Table 10 also reports that funds with more of their assets held
in an equity index are significantly less likely to engage in nonlitigation activism. Indexed funds generally are less active. This
finding is surprising, in that it counters the argument that indexed
investors will be more active because they cannot sell poorly
performing portfolio companies. 50 It suggests, however, that activism

may be driven largely by a fund's available resources and that highly
indexed funds may seek to maximize their returns by minimizing
operating costs. On the other hand, more heavily indexed funds are no
less likely to engage in litigation activism, suggesting that litigation
activism does not involve substantial out-of-pocket costs.
Lastly, Table 10 reports that there is no correlation between a
public decisionmaker and higher levels of litigation activism. This
finding casts some question on the claim that officials participate in
litigation in an effort to attract political contributions from plaintiffs'
firms-so-called "pay to play."51 We find no evidence that the
involvement of public officials correlates with greater litigation
activism.
IV.POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The funds that we talked to were extremely interested in the
amount of activism engaged in by their peer firms. Despite the fairly
high visibility of much fund activism, we found that funds are largely
unaware of each others' activities. In part, limited awareness may
reflect the fact that state and local government actors, particularly at
smaller funds, have limited opportunities to interact with their peer
institutions unless they seek out those activities through corporate
governance organizations and other networking.
Regardless of activity level, all funds described their reasons
for activism in terms of improving returns for their beneficiaries and
increasing shareholder value. Yet in our more detailed interviews,

48. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, CaliforniaPension Activist Expects to Be Ousted, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at C1 (describing claims that "the Calpers board had begun to range far
away from its fiduciary duty of protecting the retirement fund and had begun to engage in
political activism").
49. See Roberta Romano, The Politics of Public Pension Funds, PUB. INT., Spring 1995, at
42, 47-49 (identifying potential effect of political pressure on public funds' involvement in
corporate governance, and describing two examples of such pressure).
50. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 19 (making this argument).
51. See Fisch, supra note 25, at 715-16 (describing claims of pay to play).
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fund officials exhibited very little familiarity with existing empirical
evidence on corporate governance, such as studies analyzing the value
of poison pills, independent boards, or shareholder litigation. It
appears that, although public pension funds have, as a group, bought
into the claim that shareholder activism improves corporate
performance, they have little basis for ascertaining the truth of that
claim. A possible reason for this is the fairly widespread participation
of public pension funds in corporate governance organizations and
programs. The conceptual relationship between good governance and
corporate performance is heavily featured in these programs, but the
underlying empirical studies are not.
At the same time, the limited expertise of public pension funds
probably explains both their choice of non-governance activities and
their limited overall activism. As we noted above, public funds make
relatively little use of company-specific forms of activism such as
shareholder proposals and director nominations. One possible reason
may be the perception that fund officials are not well positioned to
determine weaknesses in individual firm governance structures and to
propose appropriate reforms. 52 In contrast, union funds, which are far
more active, tend to focus their proposals most heavily on
employment-related topics, on which they presumably believe that
they have particular expertise. 53 Similarly, social responsibility funds
and religious organizations can make effective use of shareholder
proposals because of their developed knowledge about topics within
54
their mission.
Lack of expertise is even more likely to explain the failure of
public pension funds to become involved in the process of identifying
52. This perception is consistent with empirical evidence failing to demonstrate that public
pension fund use of shareholder proposals improves corporate performance. See, e.g., Roberta
Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001) (summarizing the empirical
literature). It is also consistent with our finding that many funds do not have voting guidelines
and have never recalled loaned stock in order to vote it. These actions suggest a lack of
willingness or ability to evaluate governance policies at specific firms.
53. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821
F. Supp. 877, 879-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (addressing union's shareholder proposals concerning WalMart's Equal Employment Opportunity policies and programs); see also Marleen O'Connor,
Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POLY J. 97,
113-21 (2000) (describing labor unions' use of shareholder proposals to promote workers' as well
as investors' interests); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47-52 (1998) (describing history of labor
unions' use of shareholder proposals).
54. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder
Proposalsas a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM.
Bus. L.J. 365, 382-85 (2006) (describing the use of human rights social policy proposals by
religious investors, socially responsible funds, and social justice organizations).
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director candidates. As noted in Table 2 above, none of our sample
funds either submitted the names of director candidates to nominating
committees or formally nominated a director candidate in opposition
to management. It is likely that public pension funds simply lack the
capacity to identify suitable candidates. Public fund officials do not
have specialized knowledge about director qualifications or regular
contact with the types of people who might make good nominees, such
as current or retired business leaders. Nor do public pension funds
have relationships with intermediaries who can assist them in
identifying potential directors; funds do not, for example, have director
55
search firms on retainer.
A second obvious consideration is cost. Of the firms that
responded to our survey, only seven (fewer than 20%) had a separate
budget for corporate governance activities. As government agencies,
public funds are subject to substantial financial constraints, and, in
responding to our survey, virtually every fund identified cost as a
substantial consideration in determining the extent of its activism. In
addition, the payoff for shareholder activism is relatively opaque,
making it difficult for public officials to justify expenditures in terms
of an identifiable return. It is therefore unsurprising that the highest
levels of participation were focused on extremely low cost activities,
including communicating with other institutions, participating in
corporate governance organizations, voting no, and serving as lead
plaintiff.
It may be the case, however, that this attempted fiscal
prudence is somewhat short-sighted. Arguably, pension funds pay for
shareholder activism indirectly through their investments in hedge
funds and private equity (which do participate in extensive activism)
and through their use of external fund managers who may engage in
various levels of activism, ranging from full-scale proxy contests to
behind-the-scenes meetings with management. Although the funding
for this type of activism is not politically transparent in the pension
fund's budget, it ultimately may cost funds more in higher
management fees than if funds engaged in activism directly.
Funds also appear concerned about the perceived legitimacy of
their actions. Several funds reported that their trustees were
uncomfortable with public demonstrations of activism. One fund also
cited the "headline risk" associated with shareholder activism. These
concerns may reflect, in part, the longstanding regulatory constraints

55. Failure of funds to nominate director candidates may also be motivated by a fear that
such actions could result in the application of the short swing trading restrictions of section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act.
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on some types of shareholder activism. Institutions may perceive more
recent efforts to encourage institutional activism, such as the SEC's
relaxation of its proxy rules as equivocal, especially in light of
opposition efforts to characterize activism as politically motivated or
driven by special interests.
Finally, public funds make extensive use of intermediaries. The
availability of services or agents who provide expertise and manpower
is a substantial factor in determining whether funds will become
involved, especially if those services are available at little or no
additional cost to the fund. Thus, funds are willing to exercise their
voting power, but rely heavily on the assistance of proxy advisors to
formulate guidelines, make case-specific voting decisions, and submit
proxies. Funds file claim forms, but primarily through outside services
or custodians. Funds screen securities fraud claims and participate as
lead plaintiffs, but largely in response to the entrepreneurial efforts of
plaintiffs' counsel. Funds submit amicus briefs-an effort largely
controlled by the same lawyer-entrepreneurs-but do not otherwise
seek broad-based market improvements through lobbying, petitions
for rulemaking, or similar initiatives.
The foregoing factors likely explain the substantial difference
between public pension fund participation in securities litigation and
other forms of activism-both the greater overall level of involvement
by public pension funds in litigation activism and the lack of
correlation between litigation activism and fund size. Service as lead
plaintiff does not require funds to incur out-of-pocket costs other than
the relatively low visibility cost of staff time. Indeed, regular fund
staff may not face that burden because, for many public funds, their
litigation activism is carried out largely through the state Attorney
General's office. Although litigation might seem to require some
expertise in evaluating claims, outside services and lawyers provide
this expertise-preparing damage models, evaluating claim strength,
and outlining litigation strategy. These resources allow even small
funds without the resources for active participation in corporate
governance to serve as lead plaintiffs. Finally, the adoption of the lead
plaintiff provision and the legislative history of the PSLRA send a
strong message that litigation activism is desirable from a public
policy perspective. This message has been enhanced by the highly
publicized corporate scandals of the late 1990s and by the success of
institutional investors in cases such as Cendant and WorldCom in
wrongdoers
and holding
settlements
significant
recovering
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accountable. 56 Fund decisionmakers-from elected officials, to
trustees, to staffers-are government actors for whom public and
congressional opinions are of substantial importance.
What are the implications of our findings? They may be
particularly relevant with respect to the potential effect of ongoing
efforts to reform the federal proxy rules to increase the role of
institutional investors. The SEC, in response to requests that it
facilitate the exercise of shareholder power through the voting
process, 57 substantially amended the proxy rules in 1992 to enable
institutional investors to communicate more easily in proxy
solicitations. Several years ago, the SEC proposed, but did not adopt,
Rule 14a-11, which would have increased the ability of shareholdersparticularly institutional investors-to nominate director candidates
directly.58 More recently, the SEC considered but failed to adopt rule
changes that would have increased the ability of shareholders to
introduce bylaw amendments through the shareholder proposal
59
process.
Our survey results cast doubt on the extent to which public
pension funds are likely to engage in these types of initiatives. The
introduction of shareholder proposals, participation in proxy
solicitations, and nomination of director candidates are all costly.
While larger funds may have the resources to justify these costs, small
funds lack both the dollars and the manpower to engage in this type of
activism. In addition, these activities require funds to make a
judgment that the governance structure of their portfolio companies is
inadequate. Public pension funds appear unwilling or perhaps unable
to make that judgment, in part because they lack the expertise and in

56. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Settlements Totaled $5.4 Billion For Securities ClassActions in
'04, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2005, at C4 (describing record settlements in Cendant and WorldCom).
57. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 677 (2007) (advocating increasing shareholder voting power through mandatory contested
elections); Letter from Richard H. Koppes, Gen. Counsel, CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Dir., Div.
of Corp. Fin., SEC 3 (Nov. 3, 1989) (requesting SEC rule-making to revise federal proxy rules).
58. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274).
59. See Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160 (July 27, 2007) (describing
history of SEC's consideration of increased shareholder power to nominate directors through
access to the corporate proxy); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,914 (Dec. 7, 2007) (amending federal proxy rules to limit
shareholder access). In connection with its most recent rule change, Chairman Cox stated that
the SEC would continue to study proxy access and revisit the issue of shareholder access.
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the SEC Open Meeting: Electronic Shareholder
Forum Rules; Codification of Interpretation of Rule 14(a)(8)(i)(8), (Nov. 28, 2007), available at
http:/www.sec.gov/news/speech2007/spchI12807cc.htm.
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part because such judgments are inconsistent with their delegation of
investment authority to external portfolio managers, who implicitly
make that judgment in connection with their investment decisions.
On the other hand, public funds might view SEC rulemaking
as legitimizing or even demanding greater participation in the director
nomination process. The experience with the lead plaintiff provision
suggests that such a statement may outweigh the general desire
among funds to remain passive and non-confrontational. It is, of
course, unclear whether funds would respond to such a determination
by the SEC in the same manner as they would to a statement by the
democratically elected Congress. In our interviews, funds reported
respect for the SEC and its role in protecting investors' rights,
suggesting that they would view SEC action as significant.
Our survey also offers guidance for the SEC in its rulemaking
approach. The common assumption that public pension funds will be
willing to spend more than retail investors on voting, shareholder
proposals, lobbying, and so forth because of the larger size of funds'
holdings 60 may be misplaced. Because cost is a substantial concern,
shareholder initiatives that do not require substantial expenditures
are likely to generate greater public pension fund involvement.
Regulatory changes that enable public pension funds to exercise
greater influence at relatively low cost-such as majority voting and
bylaw amendments-are particularly promising. Regulatory changes
that allow institutional investors to recover the costs of sponsoring
successful initiatives also should be considered. In addition, proposals
that generate some sort of reimbursement or subsidization might
create an economic incentive for intermediaries to mobilize pension
funds in the same way that entrepreneurial lawyers have spurred
litigation activism.
Finally, public pension funds' extensive reliance on
intermediaries should be acknowledged. Our research shows that
public pension funds engage in very limited internal decisionmaking;
they rely heavily on outside lawyers, services, proxy advisors, and so
forth. The plaintiffs' bar appears to play a critical role in determining
public fund involvement in securities litigation, and the lack of
intermediaries with the economic incentive to mobilize non-litigation
activism is likely a substantial factor explaining the limited levels of
participation in such activism.

60. See, e.g., Jill Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1009, 1010 (1994) (describing claim that larger institutional stakes will lead to more
common and more efficient monitoring).
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The reliance of pension funds on intermediaries further
suggests that the structure and incentives of those intermediaries
warrant further study. Reliance on intermediaries creates an
additional layer of agency costs that is likely to depend critically on
the incentives of proxy advisor, such as 1SS, and active portfolio
managers, incentives that may differ substantially from those of the
funds themselves. These agency costs are of particular concern in light
of recent developments in shareholder voting power. Majority voting,
for example, offers institutional investors potentially new power over
director elections. 6 1 "Say on pay" provisions have been considered at a
number of issuers, and Congress is considering legislation that would
mandate a non-binding vote on executive compensation. 6 2 In debating
the desirability of increased shareholder voting rights, policymakers
should consider the extent to which public pension funds and,
potentially, other institutional investors may rely on agents, such as
63
proxy advisors, in deciding how to exercise these rights.
CONCLUSION

We report results from a unique survey of public pension funds
gauging the participation of these funds in a wide range of corporate
governance-related activities. While some highly visible funds, such as
CalPERS, engage in a number of different governance activities, most
funds in our study engage in only a limited subset of activities.
Moreover, the precise activities selected by different funds vary
substantially.
Our results demonstrate that size is strongly correlated with
non-litigation activism. Larger funds have a greater ability to spread
the fixed cost of engaging in activism across their greater asset base.
Surprisingly, however, size is not correlated with the incidence of
litigation activism. Instead, funds of all sizes engage in litigation

61. See, e.g., Louis Lavelle, Commentary: A Simple Way to Make Boards Behave, BUS. WK.,
Jan. 31, 2005, at 38 (advocating a switch from plurality to majority voting). According to
CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR ELECTIONS 1 (Nov. 2007),

http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudylll2O7.pdf, 57% of Fortune 500 companies
had adopted some form of majority voting by November 2007.
62. See Marlene Kennedy, Getting a Say on Pay for Execs, TIMESUNION.COM, Apr. 20, 2007,
http://timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storylD=582473&category=BUSINESS&newsdate=4
/20/2007 (describing the progress of H.R. 1257, sponsored by Barney Frank, in Congress).
63. We note that although ISS has dominated the market for proxy advisory services for
many years, several other firms recently have begun issuing proxy recommendations including
Proxy Governance, Glass Lewis, and Egan-Jones. Thus far, public pension funds are relying
heavily on ISS, but when other advisors begin to penetrate the market, the information available
to funds will increase dramatically.
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activism. Funds appear to treat non-litigation and litigation activism
separately. Funds that structure themselves to delegate more
functions and consequently have fewer in-house resources, as reflected
in our Delegation variable, do not engage in significantly lower levels
of litigation activism (although they report significantly lower levels of
non-litigation activism). One possible explanation for the difference is
cost. The subsidization of private securities litigation through the
class action mechanism combined with contingency fee awards
appears to affect the ability of state governmental actors-particularly
small pension funds that otherwise are not active in corporate
governance-to participate.
Several questions remain unanswered from our study. One
important question is the extent to which our findings extend to other
types of institutions. Hedge funds, mutual funds, and other
institutions are subject to dramatically different funding structures
and market constraints. At the same time, other institutions may lack
the political influence that simultaneously gives public pension funds
greater autonomy from portfolio companies and greater reason to be
motivated by non-financial considerations in their choice of activism.
A second question is the degree to which public pension fund
activism is evolving and will continue to evolve. In the twelve years
since the adoption of the PSLRA, public pension funds have increased
their involvement in securities fraud litigation dramatically, primarily
through service as lead plaintiffs, but also through direct lawsuits and
objecting to proposed settlements. Studies show that such activism is
correlated with higher settlements and lower attorneys' fees. It
remains to be seen whether corporate governance scandals like those
at Enron and WorldCom, stock options backdating, and the continued
explosive growth of executive compensation will spur funds to extend
their involvement to other forms of activism. The potential is
particularly great for public funds to add their voice, through their
vote, to the more entrepreneurial activism of hedge funds.
Finally, public pension fund activism seems to be, in part, a
function of the applicable regulatory environment. Public pension
funds began to participate in litigation in response to the lead plaintiff
provision of the PSLRA. 64 Public pension funds are paying increased
attention to voting, through the adoption of voting guidelines and
increased disclosure of their votes, in response to recent regulatory

64. See Choi, Fisch & Pritchard, supra note 25 (reporting little participation by institutional
investors as lead plaintiffs prior to the adoption of the PSLRA and increased involvement
following the adoption of the statute).
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requirements focusing on mutual fund voting. 65 Although public
pension funds may display conservatism in their governance
activities, as government actors they are likely to be highly responsive
to the public policy judgments reflected in legislation and SEC rules
concerning the appropriate level and extent of their participation in
corporate governance.

65. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No.
47, 304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (requiring mutual funds to
disclose their voting policies as well as their actual proxy votes).

